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CONTRACTS-1961 TENNESSEE SURVEY
PAUL J. HARTMAN*
I. OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE--NOTIFICATION OF ACCEPTANCE BEFORE NOTIFICATION
OF REVOCATION-DURATION OF OFFER WITH FixED ExPIRATION DATE
II. IMPLIED AND QUASI CONTRACT-CLAIM FOR SERVICES WHERE FAMILY RE-
LATIONSHIP INVOLVED
III. PAROL EVIDENCE RULE--APPLICATION OF RULE TO THIRD PARTY NOT A PARTY
TO THE WRITTEN INSTRUMENT-PRE-EXISTING DUTY AS CONSIDERATION
IV. EXCULPATORY CONTRACTS-CONTRACTING AGAINST LIABILITY FOR CONSE-
QUENCES OF OWN NEGLIGENT CONDUCT
V. AGREEMENT IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE-AGREEMENT OF SELLER OF BUSINESS NOT
To COMPETE--ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRAINT IN AREA GREATER THAN REQUIRED
To PROTECT PURCHASER
I. OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE-NOTIFICATION OF ACCEPTANCE BEFORE
NOTIFICATION OF REVOCATION-DURATION OF OFFER WITH
FIXED EXPIRATION DATE
In determining whether the parties had entered into a binding con-
tract to sell real estate in Dobson & Johnson, Inc. v. Waldron,1 the
Tennessee Court of Appeals had to deal with the question of the
termination of an offer which had a fixed expiration date; in addition,
it had to deal with the question whether real estate brokers, employed
by the vendor to sell real estate, had authority to receive an ac-
ceptance of an offer by the purchaser. The complainant-purchaser
2
sued defendant-vendor for breach of contract to sell land, asking for
specific performance of the contract, or in the alternative for damages.
Complainant had made an offer to defendant to purchase the land in
question. In response to this offer, defendant made a counter-offer
to sell, providing that this "offer expires July 1st, 1958." On June 30
complainant's acceptance of defendant's counter-offer was written on
the counter-offer itself, and on July 1 the real estate brokers who
handled the matter for defendant were notified of complainant's
acceptance. Prior to the receipt of this notice of acceptance by the
real estate brokers, defendant had not communicated to complainant
*Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee bar.
1. 336 S.W.2d 313 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1960).
2. Dobson & Johnson, Inc., a Tennessee corporation engaged in the general
real estate business, brought suit for the use and benefit of itself, Frank
L. Turner, Carl D. Storey, Jr., and Frank A. Berry, Jr., against Clarence H.
Waldron and Margaret Virginia Waldron. Dobson & Johnson, Inc. represented
the other complainants in the real estate transaction.
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any revocation of his counter-offer. After the brokers had been
notified of complainant's acceptance, defendant informed the brokers
on July 1 that he had withdrawn his counter-offer.
The chancellor who heard the case on oral testimony dismissed
the complaint, holding that no contract had come into existence. He
was of the opinion that the counter-offer had been withdrawn before
it was accepted. The court of appeals reversed and decreed specific
performance for complainant. The appellate court held that the real
estate brokers employed by defendant were proper agents to receive
notice of the acceptance by complainant of defendant's counter-offer,
and that complainant had accepted defendant's counter-offer before
it had expired or was withdrawn; therefore a binding contract had
been brought into existence.
If it is determined that the real estate brokers were the agents of
defendant,3 then, under well-settled principles of contract law, it is
exceedingly difficult to escape the conclusion that the defendant's
counter-offer was properly accepted, and that a binding contract to
sell the land in question was formed. It is almost universally settled
that a revocation of an offer (counter-offer here) requires communi-
cation to the offeree in order for the revocation to be effective; there-
fore, an acceptance of a revocable offer prior to a communicated
revocation will create a binding contract.4 The attempted revocation
in the case at hand was communicated only to the real estate brokers
employed by defendant, and this was done after complainant's ac-
ceptance had been communicated to the same brokers. These brokers
were found not to be agents of complainant, but rather agents of
defendant. The acceptance was thus received by defendant through
his agents prior to any communicated revocation to complainant or
its agents. If the offer had not lapsed, the acceptance became operative
when communicated to these agents of defendant, and a contract for
the sale of the land in question was formed.
The only remaining question presented in this case is whether or
not defendant's counter-offer had lapsed on July 1, when complainant
purported to accept. The counter-offer expressly stated it would
expire July 1. The lack of authority squarely on point is little
short of amazing. The court of appeals, however, seems to have
reached a logical conclusion when it decided that the counter-offer
had not lapsed.
3. Elsewhere in this survey of Tennessee law, Mr. Overton has dis-
cussed the agency question re whether the brokers could properly be con-
sidered the agents of the defendant. See pp. 1124-25 supra.




. II. IMPLIED AND QUASI CONTRACT-CLAIM FOR
SERVICES WHERE FAMILY RELATIONSHIP INVOLVED
The Tennessee Court of Appeals case of Cotton v.'Roberts5 involves
a rather close question of whether complainant should be allowed to
recover against defendant (executor of an estate) either on im-
plied or quasi contract for services performed for defendant's
decedent during her life. Complainant, a nephew of the deceased
Mrs. Roberts (defendant's testator), sued Mrs. Robert's estate for
services performed for her over a thirty-five-year period, until her
death in 1956. Mrs. Roberts was a widow during this entire period.
The claim was based on several items, including: (1) driving de-
cedent's automobile for eleven years; (2) transporting decedent in
complainant's own automobile for twenty-four years; (3) running
errands, getting groceries, feeding and tending livestock, and milk-
ing; and (4) hauling crops for decedent.
On the other side of the ledger, claimant lived quite near decedent
on a large, productive farm owned by decedent under a crop sharing
contract. In her will, decedent left complainant a larger individual
portion of her property than she did any other beneficiary. Moreover,
during decedent's lifetime, she and complainant had regular settle-
ments of their farm business, at which time each party accounted
to the other in full. During none of these settlements, nor at any other
time during decedent's life, did claimant ever claim that decedent
owed him anything for any of the services on which his present claim
was predicated.
Under all these circumstances, the lower court held, and the court
of appeals agreed, that claimant's services to decedent, while valuable,
were not rendered with a reasonable expectation of pay. Therefore
no recovery was allowed to complainant. The court's opinion seems to
stress three main factors in finding no expectation of pay: (1)
claimant was a nephew of decedent; (2) claimant and decedent had
regular settlements of accounts during the period when the services
were rendered and no claim for the services in question had been
made at such times; and (3) the services were performed by com-
plainant with the hope that decedent would provide for him in her
will. Although complainant may have been disappointed at the
extent of decedent's bounty which he received in her will, he was
nevertheless a major beneficiary and cannot now recover, as an
afterthought, for the services. So reasoned the court.
While the court talks primarily of implied contract as complainant's
theory of recovery, his claim could properly be based on either im-
plied contract or quasi contract. While there are distinct differences
5. 337 S.W.2d 776 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1960).
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between the two, there are also some similar essentials in both,6 as
will be presently seen. Moreover, a case may be one of implied or
quasi contract depending upon a slight variation in facts, and the
courts do not always differentiate between these two different theories
of liability.
7
If a party giving the performance (complainant here) reasonably
expects to be paid, and the other party (decedent here) either in-
tended to pay or should have known that complainant expected to be
paid, then there arises a claim based on implied contract.8 This is a
genuine contract (offer and acceptance), which is spelled out of, or
implied from, the conduct of the parties; it differs from an express
contract, essentially, only in the method of proof.9
If a party giving the performance (complainant here) reasonably
expected to be paid, if he conferred a benefit on the recipient of the
performance (decedent here), and if he was not officious (a volunteer),
then he has a claim in quasi contract.10 Quasi contract is not predi-
cated upon agreement or promises, and manifested intent to contract
is not an essential element in its structure. It is generally based on
the idea of unjust enrichment."
It will be seen, however, from examining the essentials of both the
implied contract and quasi contract that complainant will be denied a
recovery if he performed his services without a reasonable expecta-
tion of pay. As the Cotton opinion makes clear, under such circum-
stances the services would be a gratuity and no recovery will be
allowed. Complainant cannot be an "Indian giver."
In view of the facts, the Cotton case does not seem unreasonable
in its conclusion that when complainant performed the services he
did not reasonably expect to be paid, and the decedent did not reason-
ably think that he expected to be paid. As we have already seen,
complainant and decedent periodically settled accounts during the
6. Elsewhere in earlier surveys of the Tennessee law, the writer has dis-
cussed in some detail the differences and similarities in implied contract and
quasi contract. Consequently, any extended treatment of that facet of the
subject is not necessary at this time. See Hartman, Contracts-1959 Tennessee
Survey, 12 VA'D. L, REv. 1110 (1959); Hartman, Contracts-1957 Tennessee
Survey, 10 VAND. L. REv. 1013, 1050 (1957).
7. E.g., Murray v. Grissim, 40 Tenn. App. 246, 290 S.W.2d 888 (M.S. 1956),
where plaintiff's suit for services was based on both quasi contract and
implied contract. Plaintiff recovered.
8. Hill v. Waxburg Constr. Co., 237 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1956); Spencer v.
Spencer, 181 Mass. 471, 63 N.E. 947, 948 (1902); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §
3, 36 (3d ed. 1957); 1 CoRBix, CONTRACTS § 18 (1952).
9. Murray v, Grissim, 40 Tenn. App. 246, 250, 290 S.W.2d 888 (M.S. 1956);
1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 3, 36, 36A (3d ed. 1957); 1 CORsN, CONTRACTS § 18
(1950) ; RESTATEMNT, CONTRACTS §§ 5, 72 (1932).
10. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 3, 3A (3d ed. 1957); 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§ 19 (1952).
11. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 3A (3d ed. 1957).
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period when complainant rendered the services in question. No claim
was ever made by complainant for the services at such settlements,
nor at any other time during decedent's life. Although complainant
was disappointed at what he received by decedent's will, the court
was satisfied that complainant performed these services because he
expected that he would receive something under decedent's will.
Moreover, the family relationship of complainant and decedent may
tend to negate a reasonable expectation of pay. As it is stated in
Williston on Contracts:
Silent Acceptance and Family Relationship. The inference that services
are to be paid for at their reasonable or fair value where no price has
been stipulated is not usually drawn where these services are rendered
to a member of the family circle by another member of the same house-
hold or close relative.12
Probably, however, the relationship of aunt and nephew in the
Cotton case would not be enough in itself to warrant a finding that
there was no reasonable expectation of pay.
13
If services are accepted, it is nearly always a question of fact
whether a reasonable man in the position of the parties would under-
stand that they are offered in return for a fair compensation, or
rather would suppose that they are offered gratuitously, or if not,
that the recipient might think so.14 While complainant has an ap-
pealing claim for valuable services rendered over a thirty-five-year
period, under the circumstances the triers of fact (trial court and
court of appeals) resolved the fact question of expectation of pay
against complainant. It would be difficult, therefore, to find much
quarrel with Judge Humphreys' opinion on this aspect of the Cotton
case.
Unfortunately, there is some language in the Cotton opinion that
is a bit confusing. In his opinion in that case, Judge Humphreys
seems to lay down as a cardinal principle of the law of implied
contracts that "in order to make out an implied contract for the
rendition of services, facts and circumstances must be shown which
12. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 91AA (3d ed. 1957). For an extensive col-
lection of cases dealing with recovery for services rendered by members of
household or family, other than spouses, without express agreement for com-
pensation, see Annot., 7 A.L.R.2d 8 (1949).
13. See Annot., 7 A.L.R.2d 8, 36 (1949), where the cases are summarized
to the effect that the relation existing between uncle or aunt and nephew
or niece is generally considered insufficient in itself to raise a presumption
of gratuity with respect to services rendered by one to the other, or to
rebut the general implication of a promise to pay for such services. See,
e.g., In re Burg's Estate, 282 Mich. 304, 276 N.W. 458 (1937), where compen-
sation was awarded to a nephew who carried on his aunt's business; the jury
found he did so with expectation of payment.
14. 1 WILISTON, CONTRACTS § 36 (3d ed. 1957).
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amount to a request for services."15 A little later in the same para-
graph of his opinion, however, he states an inconsistent proposition of
law that "in the absence of facts and circumstances amounting to
such a request, a contract may yet be implied when the facts and
circumstances show that the person receiving the benefit of such
work or services knew, or reasonably should have known, that the
person doing the work expected to be paid and that the services
were performed and accepted on this basis." This last statement by
Judge Humphreys is in line with the authorities that make it clear
that such a request for the services is not necessary for an implied
contractual recovery. As Mr. Williston summarizes the law in his
monumental treatise on contracts: "And even though no request is
made for the performance of work or service, if it is known that it
is being rendered with the expectation of pay, the person benefited is
liable.'
6
It is unfortunate that Judge Humphreys gratuitously states an
erroneous and inconsistent proposition of law in what is an otherwise
lucid treatment of an implied contracts question.
III. PAROL EVIDENcE RULE-APPLICATION OF RULE TO THIRD PARTY NOT
A PARTY TO THE WRITTEN INsTRUIM:ENT-PRE-ExIsTING DUTY AS
CONSIDERATION
Memphis Street Railway v. Williams1? raised the question whether
the parol evidence rule prevented plaintiffs from showing that an
alleged release of one joint tort-feasor was not a release of the other
joint tort-feasor, the defendant; he was not a party to the agreement
constituting the release. Plaintiffs, who were injured by a tort jointly
committed by defendant and Graham Transfer, settled their claim
with Graham Transfer and sued defendant. Its defense was that
it was released by reason of the release given by plaintiffs to Gra-
ham Transfer. Plaintiffs took the position that they had only exe-
cuted a covenant not to sue Graham Transfer and had not released
their cause of action in tort. At the trial, plaintiffs undertook to
show by extrinsic evidence that a release of the tort claim had not
been intended, although plaintiffs actually had agreed in writing to
release the tort claim. To counter plaintiffs' efforts to show that they
had not executed a release, defendant invoked the parol evidence rule.
Under orthodox common law doctrine, the release by the injured
party of one joint tort-feasor released the others; the theory behind
15. 337 S.W.2d at 779.
16. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 36, at 101-02 (3d ed. 1957). See also 1 id. §
91A.
17. 338 S.W.2d 639 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
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this doctrine was that the injured party had a single cause of action
against the wrongdoers, and when he released one of them this single
cause of action was extinguished. 18 On the other hand, a covenant
not to sue given by an injured party to one joint tort-feasor did
not release any of the tort-feasors, but was simply an agreement
not to enforce the cause of action against one or more of the tort-
feasors; the cause of action continued to exist and was enforceable
against the other joint tort-feasors. 19
The common law doctrine that the release of one joint tort-feasor
bars any action against those jointly liable has been severely criti-
cized,20 and has lost much of its force by legislative 2' and judicial
action.2 2 Nevertheless, this anachronistic doctrine still holds a firm
beach-head in our legal system,23 including Tennessee.2 4
The point involved in the Memphis Street Railway case was
whether plaintiffs had executed a release to Graham Transfer or had
simply given a covenant not to sue. The controversy on this facet of
the case stemmed from the fact that plaintiffs did execute with
Graham Transfer a covenant not to sue, and plaintiffs accepted, en-
dorsed, and cashed checks given by Graham Transfer's insurance
company in payment of the settlement; the checks contained reci-
tations that they were given in release of plaintiffs' claims arising out
of the collision in which they were injured.
In affirming a judgment for plaintiffs against the defendant, the
court of appeals rejected defendant's contention that plaintiffs had
released it from liability. The court held that plaintiffs only intended
to execute a covenant not to sue, and not a release. The court thought
that the trial court properly admitted parol evidence to show that
the plaintiffs intended only to execute a covenant not to sue, and
18. See PROSSER, TORTS § 46 (2d ed. 1955).
19. Ibid
20. Various reasons have been given for the dissatisfaction with the rule,
among which are the following: (1) the rule is a trap for the unwary re-
leasor; (2) it often disregards the actual intent of the parties and prevents
full compensation; (3) it discharges the wrongdoer who does not con-
tribute; and (4) it is generally unjust. The common law doctrine has been
extensively criticized by text writers. E.g., 1 HARPER & JAMES, ToRTs 711-12
(1956); PRossER, ToaRs § 46 (2d ed. 1955).
21. For a succinct and comprehensive summary of the law on the subject
of the release of joint tortfeasors, including the legislative developments,
see 12 VAND. L. REV. 1414 (1959).
22. For judicial developments along this line, see 12 VAND. L. REV. 1414
(1959). For a fairly recent case where the court refused to hold that the
release of one joint tort-feasor released the other, see Breen v. Peck, 48 N.J.
Super. 160, 137 A.2d 37 (App. Div. 1957).
23. E.g., Brewer v. Casey, 196 Mass. 384, 82 N.E. 45 (1907); King v. Powell,
220 N.C. 511, 17 S.E.2d 659 (1941); Turner v. Pfisterer, 137 N.E.2d 168 (Ohio
1954). For a collection of states where the doctrine still has vitality, see 12
VAND L. REV. 1414, 1416 (1959).
24. Byrd v. Crowder, 166 Tenn. 215, 60 S.W.2d 171 (1933).
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did not intend to execute a release of their cause of action. The
language on the checks stating that it was a release was treated by
the court as surplusage.
The court in Memphis Street Railway took the position that the
case turned entirely on whether or not it was proper to admit parol
evidence to show that the parties did intend to execute a covenant
not to sue, rather than a release of the tort claim. The court was of
the opinion that such parol evidence was properly admitted, on the
ground that the parol evidence rule is applicable only to the parties
to the instrument (plaintiffs and Graham Transfer) and cannot affect
third parties (defendant here) who might be prejudiced by the con-
tents of the written document. Hence, concluded the court, the rule
would not exclude the parol evidence which showed that the plaintiffs
and Graham Transfer did not intend to execute a release of the tort
claim.
To be sure, in numerous cases it is said that the parol evidence
rule has no application in contests between one of the parties to the
writing and a stranger.25 Tennessee courts follow this view26 on the
ground that the parol evidence rule cannot affect third parties who
might be prejudiced by things contained in the writing. That reason-
ing can scarcely have any application to the Memphis Street Railway
case, because the third party (defendant) invoked the parol evidence
rule so as to protect his alleged rights as found in the writing. More-
over, it is hard to defend the position that the parol evidence rule has
no application to third parties who are strangers to the writing in ques-
tion, and the leading authorities in the field take the contrary posi-
tion.27 These authorities, as well as many courts, agree that if the
parol evidence rule is correctly stated and understood, the rule is
applicable in favor of or against a third party who was not a party
to the written instrument.28 Where the issue is the legal relation
created by the writing between the parties to it, the parol evidence
25. E.g., Essington v. Parrish, 164 F.2d 725 (7th Cir. 1947) (parol evidence
used to show release intended only as covenant not to sue); Broder v.
Epstein, 101 Cal. App. 2d 197, 225 P.2d 10, 11 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950); Cunning-
ham v. Day Bros. Eng'r Co., 55 A.2d 89, 90 (D.C. 1947); Bowman v. Tax
Comm'n, 135 Ohio St. 295, 20 N.E.2d 916, 919 (1939); In, re Frederick's
Estate, 156 Pa. Super. 547, 41 A.2d 59, 62 (1945).
26. Nashville Interurban Ry. v. Gregory, 137 Tenn. 422, 193 S.W. 1053, 1056
(1917); Swift v. Beaty, 39 Tenn. App. 292, 282 S.W.2d 655, 658 (W.S. 1954).
27. See MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 354 (1954); 9 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2446 (3d ed. 1940); 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 596 (1960); 3 WILLSTON,
CONTRACTS § 647 (rev. ed. 1936).
28. E.g., Flynn v. Butler, 189 Mass. 377, 75 N.E. 730 (1905) (release of
claim against one tort-feasor could not be varied by parol evidence); Loria's
Garage, Inc. v. Smith, 49 N.J. Super. 242, 139 A.2d 430, 434 (App. Div.
1958); National Power Co. v. Clark, 31 Wyo. 284, 225 Pac. 586 (1924) (re-
lease of one joint tort-feasor could not be varied by parol evidence). See
Harris, Does the Parol Evidence Rule Apply When One of the Parties to the
Controversy Is a Stranger to the Contract, 22 ILL. L. REV. 274 (1927).
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rule is thought applicable regardless of the parties to the litigation. 2
In the case at hand, defendant's rights regarding the release are
derived entirely from the legal relation created by the written agree-
ment between plaintiffs and Graham Transfer. If the agreement be-
tween plaintiffs and Graham Transfer is so completely integrated
in the written release that the parol evidence rule would prevent
the parties to that agreement from introducing parol evidence to
change or affect the meaning of the written agreement, then it is most
difficult to understand how parol evidence could be used by a
stranger to the document to show that his rights, flowing entirely
from the written release, are different from the legal relation created
for him by the release. On the other side of the coin, if the agree-
ment between plaintiffs and Graham Transfer is so completely
integrated in the release that parol evidence could not be used in a
suit between plaintiffs and Graham Transfer, then it is most difficult
to see how plaintiffs can logically and reasonably use parol evidence
to show that their legal relationship with defendant, with respect
to the same release, was different from the legal relationship set forth
in its entirety in the release. This is because the legal relation be-
tween plaintiffs and defendant regarding the release stems entirely
from the agreement between plaintiffs and Graham Transfer. If prior
agreements of plaintiffs and Graham Transfer are completely inte-
grated in their release, then by the same token the release agreement
is the sole embodiment of the legal relation between plaintiffs and
defendant in so far as it concerns the question of whether defendant
was released. As one court has succinctly stated the pith of the
matter recently: "If there be a complete written integration, the rule
is the same no matter who asserts or denies the release; the intention
of the parties is equally binding upon strangers to the instrument. 30
Or, as Professor Corbin puts it: "If A has a claim for damages against
B, and this claim is honestly discharged by a release or an accord
and satisfaction, the operation of this discharge is not affected by the
fact that it is C who afterwards asserts or denies it. ' '31
While Professor Corbin is of the firm conviction that if "two parties
have by a complete written integration discharged and nullified an-
tecedent negotiations between them, they are so discharged and
nullified without regard to whoever may be asserting or denying the
fact,"32 he would nevertheless go much farther than most authorities
in allowing the parties to establish by parol evidence that there was
not a complete written integration. He would permit parties to show
29. See authorities cited notes 26 and 27 supra.
30. Atlantic Northern Airlines v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293, 96 A.2d 652, 655-
56 (1953).
31. 3 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 596, at 572 (1960).
32. Ibid.
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by parol evidence that what appears on the face of an instrument to
be a "release" of one joint tort-feasor was not intended as a dis-
charge of another such obligor or tort-feasor.33 Such parol evidence
should be admitted, argues Professor Corbin, to show that the claimant
did not intend the document to be a discharge of all of his claims.
His position is that the parties could thus show whether the written
release was a complete and accurate integration of their agreement.
Thus, under his approach, what is plainly designated in the written
document as a "release" can be shown by the. claimant through ex-
trinsic evidence to be only a covenant not to sue.34 For such purposes
he concludes that "it [the parol evidence] should be admissible in
any suit against anybody."35 It is submitted that Professor Corbin's
view goes far toward destroying the purpose of the parol evidence
rule, which is the stabilizing of commercial transactions. His approach
presumably would sanction the use of parol evidence in the Memphis
Street Railway case to show that the release executed by plaintiffs
with Graham Transfer was intended to be no more than a covenant
not to sue Graham Transfer, and was not a release of their entire
cause of action. It should be made clear, however, that Professor
Corbin would not be sanctioning the use of parol evidence on the
ground that the parol evidence rule has no application to strangers
to the writing; he would admit it to determine whether the release
was a complete integration of the agreement between plaintiffs and
Graham Transfer.
36
In the Memphis Street Railway case, if the covenant not to sue and
the release clause had been contained in the same document, or had
been executed contemporaneously, apparently parol testimony could
properly have been used to clear up an ambiguity, thus showing
whether a release or a covenant not to sue was intended.37 The use of
parol evidence would appear proper to clear up an ambiguity be-
cause the single transaction would have contained the conflicting
agreements of a covenant not to sue and a release. The admittance
of parol evidence would have been especially proper under these
circumstances if, as in the case at hand, the covenant not to sue had
reserved to plaintiffs their right to proceed against all persons other
than Graham Transfer.
However, a different situation is presented in the actual case at
33. 3 id. § 596.
34. Ibid. A recent case following Corbin is Breen v. Peck, 48 N.J. Super. 160,
137 A.2d 37 (App. Div. 1957).
35. 3 id. § 596, at 576-77.
36. 3 id. § 596, at 572-73.
37. Parol evidence is always admissible to explain or clarify ambiguous
terms of a writing. E.g., Meader v. Allen, 110 Iowa 588, 81 N.W. 799 (1900);
Faulkner v. Ramsey, 178 Tenn. 370, 158 S.W.2d 710 (1942); Wheelwright v.
Pure Milk Ass'n, 208 Wis. 40, 240 N.W. 769 (1932).
1961] 1205
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
hand because the release agreement presumably was executed by
plaintiffs and Graham Transfer after the covenant not to sue. Under
those circumstances, the agreement releasing plaintiffs' tort claim
could properly be considered to have integrated completely the
agreement between Graham Transfer and plaintiffs. If the release
agreement became the final, complete and binding expression of the
agreement between plaintiffs and Graham Transfer, then it is most
difficult to see how parol evidence could properly be used to show
that the plain and unambiguous release agreement was actually no
more than a covenant not to sue. This is true since the written
integration of an agreement makes all prior or contemporaneous
extrinsic agreements relating to the same subject, whether oral or
written, inoperative for purposes of varying or adding to the principal
agreement.38
What is the criterion for determining whether there has been a
complete integration sufficient to prevent the use of evidence of prior
or contemporaneous extrinsic agreements? While the authorities are
not in complete accord, many courts take the position that where the
writing (release agreement here) deals with the particular subject-
matter of the alleged prior or contemporaneous agreement (settlement
containing covenant not to sue here), there is a firm basis for a
reasonable deduction that it (release agreement here) was intended
to be a complete integration.39 The release in the Memphis Street
Railway case did recite that plaintiffs were releasing their claims aris-
ing out of the collision in question.
While not mentioned in the Memphis Street Railway opinion, the
real pivotal point on which the case seems properly to turn is one of
consideration. Did Graham Transfer give any consideration for the
release agreement executed by plaintiffs which was separate and
apart from the consideration given for the plaintiffs' covenant not
to sue? That is to say, did plaintiffs enter a binding contract giving
Graham Transfer an actual release of the tort claim, as distinguished
from their covenant not to sue? The tendering of the checks contain-
ing the release clearly could be an offer to plaintiffs for a contract of
release;40 the cashing of the checks could clearly constitute an ac-
ceptance of the offer for a release. 41 There remains, however, the
question whether Graham Transfer gave any consideration to support
38. See MORGAN, op. cit. supra note 27, at 342-43; 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §
573 (1960); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 237 (1932).
39. See MORGAN, op. cit. supra note 27, at 344; 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2430
(3d ed. 1940).
40. Grubb v. Anderson, 198 Tenn. 492, 281 S.W.2d 241 (1955); Barham v.
Bank, 94 Ark. 158, 126 S.W. 394 (1910); Kall v. W. G. Block Co., 319 Ill. 339,
150 N.E. 254 (1926); Beck Elec. Constr. Co. v.'National Contracting Co., 143
Minn. 149, 173 N.W. 413 (1919).
41. 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1854 (rev. ed. 1938); cases cited note 40 supra.
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plaintiffs' promise of release. It would appear that no consideration
was given, and therefore the alleged release was not binding for want
of consideration.
The release clause on the checks in the Memphis Street Railway
case was printed by the insuror of Graham Transfer on all checks
given by it in settlement of claims against those it insured. When
the insurance company's checks containing the release clause were
tendered to plaintiffs, they were tendered as discharge of the pre-
existing duty to pay as per the terms of the previously executed
agreement containing only plaintiffs' covenant not to sue Graham
Transfer. Plaintiffs could not have become bound contractually on
the release agreement until plaintiffs cashed the insurance company's
checks containing the release clause. That would have been the ac-
ceptance of the insurance company's offer for a release. Presumably
the cashing of the check took-place after the parties had entered into
the contract of settlement containing the covenant not to sue. Thus,
when plaintiffs allegedly agreed to the release, Graham Transfer and
the insurance company were already under a legal obligation to pay
plaintiffs a liquidated, undisputed sum certain, with plaintiffs having
executed only their covenant not to sue as consideration for the prom-
ise to pay. Plaintiffs received from neither Graham Transfer nor the
insurance company that issued the checks in settlement of plaintiffs'
claims any additional consideration for plaintiffs' promise to release
Graham Transfer. Hence, under the pre-existing duty rule, the per-
formance of what Graham Transfer and the insurance company were
already legally obligated to do could not constitute consideration to
support plaintiffs' promise (if it was a promise) to release the tort
claim against Graham Transfer.42 Consequently, the release was not
a binding contract, and it therefore released neither Graham Transfer
nor defendant. The only relevant remaining binding contractual ob-
ligation was plaintiffs' covenant not to sue Graham Transfer, which
would not release plaintiffs' tort claim against defendants.
IV. EXcULPATORY CONTRACTS-CONTRACTING AGAINST LIABILITY FOR
CONSEQUENCES OF OwN NEGLIGENT CONDUCT
The Tennessee Supreme Court case of Moss v. Fortune43 presented
the question whether the operator of a business which rented riding
horses to the public could contract away his liability for injury
resulting from his own negligence in furnishing a defective stirrup
to a renter of a horse. Plaintiff, who rented a horse from defendant,
42. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 120 (3d ed. 1957); 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§
171-75 (1960).
43. 340 S.W.2d 902 (Tenn. 1960).
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sued defendant for personal injuries suffered by plaintiff when a
stirrup strap broke. Plaintiff claimed that defendant was negligent in
furnishing a defective stirrup strap. By way of defense, the defendant
interposed an agreement by which plaintiff, on renting the horse,
agreed to assume all risks. Plaintiff, by demurrer, claimed the agree-
ment was invalid. In affirming a lower court judgment for defendant,
the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that plaintiff had contractually
excused defendant from the consequences of his negligence, and that
such an exculpatory clause was valid.
In determining the validity of a contract by which one party agrees
to free the other from liability for damages which the former may
suffer in the future because of the negligence of the latter, certain
important and conflicting considerations of social policy must be
balanced against each other. Two broad policies of the law that
directly clash with each other are (1) the policy of freedom of
contract and (2) the undesirable social effect of a contract which
relieves a party for the harm caused by his own wrongful conduct.
The resolution of this conflict of social policies is not easy, and the
cases are by no means completely harmonious.
In some few cases the rule is laid down that one simply cannot
insulate himself from liability for his own negligent conduct. By
this view, such contracts relieving against liability for negligence in
the future are invalid.44 Most jurisdictions, however, do not go so
far in regard to simple negligence, 45 although it is well established
that there are some situations where contracts relieving from liability
for negligence will almost always be struck down as against public
policy. Thus, the law seems well settled that a common carrier,
owing a duty to serve all qualified persons who apply, cannot, when
acting in its public capacity, validly exempt itself by contract from
liability for negligence. This doctrine was early applied to carriers
by the Supreme Court of the United States in New York Central
Railroad v. Lockwood.4 In deciding that a clause in the contract
exculpating a carrier from liability for its negligence was invalid,
the Court relied heavily on the disparity in bargaining power be-
tween the carrier and its individual customers. Of course, a carrier
with its monopoly has the power to exact a contract that is most
favorable to it; on the other hand, the traveller or shipper must either
agree to relieve the carrier of liability for its negligence, or refuse to
44. See Papakalos v. Shaka, 91 N.H. 265, 18 A.2d 377 (1941).
45. For authority that a party may normally contract away his liability
for the consequences of his simple negligence, see McKAY v. Louisville &
N.R.R., 133 Tenn. 590, 182 S.W. 874 (1916); 6 WILUSTON, CONTACTS § 1751B
(rev. ed. 1938). For a good comment dealing with the subject of contracting
against liability for negligent conduct, see 4 Mo. L. REv. 55 (1939).
46. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357 (1873).
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agree at the risk of great inconvenience. An additional argument
advanced as a reason for declaring any exculpatory contract invalid
is the possibility that the party who has such immunity from liability
will become lax in the performance of his duties. The incentive to use
due care would be destroyed if harm can be inflicted with impunity
because of the relieving clause.
In a great many similar situations not involving common carriers,
the relative bargaining power of the contracting parties appears to be
the most dominant factor in determining the validity of exculpatory
clauses.47 A contractual exemption from liability for negligence is
rarely upheld where the contracting parties do not stand on a footing
of approximate bargaining equality. The farther apart the contracting
parties are in their relative bargaining strength the greater is the
likelihood that the exculpatory clause will be struck down. Validity
generally is denied to contracts exempting from liability for its
negligence the party which has an appreciably superior bargaining
position. But whatever the reason given in the opinions, the doctrine
that a common carrier cannot validly contract away its liability for
the consequence of its negligence has been widely accepted by the
courts.48 Having once found lodgment, this doctrine has been ex-
tended in varying degrees to public utilities and businesses of a
similar nature which are thought to be affected with the public
interest.49 Thus, a telegraph company with its superior bargaining
pqwer resulting from its limited competition, plus its duty owed to
the public, is in much the same situation as a common carrier with
respect to the telegraph company's power to exculpate itself from
liability for negligence. Consequently, most courts hold that in the
absence of a permissive statute any contractual limitation on the
liability of a telegraph company is invalid because of public policy.50
47. See Annot., 175 A.L.R. 8 (1948) for a very extensive collection of cases
on the subject of limiting liability for ones own negligence. The statement
made in the text accompanying this footnote is repeatedly emphasized there.
48. Pierce v. Southern Pac. Co., 120 Cal. 156, 47 Pac. 874 (1897); Shella-
barger Elevator Co. v. Illinois C.R.R., 278 Ill. 333, 116 N.E. 170 (1917); Insur-
ance Co. v. Lake Erie & W.R.R., 152 Ind. 333, 53 N.E. 382 (1899); Cox v.
Vermont C.R.R., 170 Mass. 129, 49 N.E. 97 (1898); see Thomas v. At-
lantic C.L.R.R., 201 F.2d 167, 169 (5th Cir. 1953); Carolina, C. & 0. Ry.
v. Unaka Springs Lumber Co., 130 Tenn. 354, 367, 170 S.W. 591 (1914); 6
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1751C (rev. ed. 1938); Annot., 175 A.L.R. 8, 38-39
(1948). However, where a common carrier or public utility is not acting in the
discharge of its duty as a carrier or utility, it may validly contract against
liability for its negligence. Baltimore & O.S.R.R. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498
(1899); see Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Circus Shows v. Olivera, 119
F.2d 584, 587 (9th Cir. 1941).
49. Gas companies: Fairfax Gas & Supply Co. v. Hadary, 151 F.2d 939
(4th Cir. 1945), noted 19 So. CAL. L. REV. 441 (1946); electric companies:
Denver Consol. Elec. Co. v. Lawrence, 31 Colo. 301, 73 Pac. 39 (1903); Turner
v. Southern Power Co., 154 N.C. 131, 69 S.E. 767 (1910). See 6 WILUSTON,
CONTRACTS § 1751C (rev. ed. 1938).
50. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Chamblee, 122 Ala. 428, 25 So. 232 (1898);
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In view of the obligation imposed upon banks by the common law
to refrain at their peril from making disbursements after receipt
of a stop payment notice, banks have often tried to restrict their
liability by exculpatory clauses, either by a stipulation in the deposit
slip or in the form provided by the bank for stop payment notices.
The validity of such release clauses has been the subject of conflicting
judicial opinions. By what is thought to be the weight of authority,
a bank may limit its common law liability for wrongful payment after
having received a stop payment notice.51 The policy that the parties
should have the utmost freedom of contract is permitted by the courts
of this persuasion to outweigh the public policy considerations against
the validity of such agreements exempting the bank from liability.
There is one line of authority, however, that treats such release
clauses in the bank-depositor relationship as contrary to public policy
and invalid.52 Perhaps a bank and its depositor may, in legal con-
templation, be viewed as having equal bargaining power and freedom
of contract; but full recognition of modern day realities may well sug-
gest a contrary conclusion.53 The somewhat monopolistic character of
the banking business may make it necessary for the individual either to
accept the offered terms or to forego the desired services altogether.
Moreover, the bank has been entrusted with an important franchise
to serve the public and has received broad legislative protection. In
light of all these circumstances, it is not surprising that a number
of courts have treated the bank as a quasi-public enterprise, similar
to an utility, and have invalidated exculpatory clauses in the bank's
contract with the depositor.5
The cases vary widely as to the power of a purely private contractor
to stipulate by contract against liability for negligence. If there is no
great disparity of bargaining power between the contracting parties,
the contracts exempting from liability for the consequences of negli-
gence will likely be upheld.55 The policy favoring the freedom of
contract is regarded as paramount. Some authorities take the view
that the employer and employee do not stand upon an equal footing
Thompson v. Western Union Tel. Co., 64 Wis. 531, 25 N.W. 789 (1885); see
6 WInLSTON, CONTRACTS § 1751C (rev. ed. 1938); Annot., 175 A.L.R. 8, 42-75
(1948).
51. Hodnick v. Fidelity Trust Co., 96 Ind. App. 342, 183 N.E. 488 (1932);
Tremont Trust Co. v. Burack, 235 Mass. 398, 126 N.E. 782 (1920); Gaita v.
Windsor Bank, 251 N.Y. 152, 167 N.E. 203 (1929).
52. Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 248 Pac. 947 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1926); Reinhardt v. Passaic-Clifton Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 16 N.J.
Super. 430, 84 A.2d 741 (Super. Ct. 1951); Speroff v. First-Central Trust Co.,
149 Ohio St. 415, 79 N.E.2d 119 (1948); see Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 1155 (1948).
53. See Reinhardt v. Passaic-Clifton Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 16 N.J. Super.
430, 84 A.2d 741, 744 (Super. Ct. 1951).
54. See cases cited note 52 supra.
55. See Standard Ins. Co. v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 186 F.2d 44, 46 (10th
Cir. 1950); 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1751A, 1751B (rev. ed. 1938).
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when entering into a contract of employment. Consequently, con-
tracts excusing the employer from the consequences of his negligence
have been declared invalid.56
Where a bailee contracts against the results of a negligent dis-
charge of his duty as a bailee, the cases are in confusion as to the
validity of such an agreement.57 While the weight of authority seems
to be that the bailee can so relieve himself, nevertheless there is a
strong tendency in the more recent decisions to regard such contracts
void as violative of public policy, particularly where made by what
might be called the professional bailee, such as the owners of parcel
checkrooms,58 owners of parking places,59 garagemen,60 and especially
warehousemen.61
Regarding the lessor and the lessee, the courts normally take the
position that they stand upon an equal footing from the standpoint
of bargaining power, and the courts usually treat as enforceable a
clause exempting the landlord from the consequences of his own
negligence.62
56. Chicago, W. & V. Coal Co. v. Peterson, 39 Ill. App. 114 (1890); Palmer v.
Boston & M.R.R., 227 Mass. 493, 116 N.E. 899 (1917); Johnston v. Fargo, 184
N.Y. 379, 77 N.E. 388 (1906); Hilleary v. Bromley, 82 Ohio App. 473, 75 N.E.2d
818 (1947); see 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1751D (rev. ed. 1938).
57. For cases taking the view that the bailee can exculpate himself, see
Hall-Scott Motor Car Co. v. Universal Ins. Co., 122 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1941);
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. United States, 34 F.2d 100
(4th Cir. 1929); World's Columbian Exposition Co. v. Republic of France,
96 Fed. 687 (7th Cir. 1899); Interstate Compress Co. v. Agnew, 276 Fed. 882
(8th Cir. 1921); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Fuqua, 150 Ark. 145, 233 S.W. 926
(1921). For cases taking the view that such exculpatory clauses are invalid,
see Compafiia de Navagacion v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 277 U.S. 66 (1928);
Alaska Commercial Co. v. Williams, 128 Fed. 362 (9th Cir. 1904). See Annot.,
175 A.L.R. 8, 111 (1948), giving collection of cases upholding the clause, as
well as cases striking down the clause.
58. Hotels Statler Co. v. Safier, 103 Ohio St. 638, 134 N.E. 460 (1921);
Denver Union Terminal Ry. v. Cullinan, 72 Colo. 248, 210 Pac. 602 (1922).
59. Miller's Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Parker, 234 N.C. 20, 65 S.E.2d 341
(1951); see Annot., 175 A.L.R. 8, 123-28 (1948).
60. Renfroe v. Fouche, 26 Ga. App. 340, 106 S.E. 303 (1921); Weinberger v.
Werremeyer, 224 Ill. App. 217 (1921); Scott Auto & Supply Co. v. McQueen, 111
Okla. 107, 226 Pac. 372 (1924); Pilson v. Tip-Top Auto Co., 67 Ore. 528, 136
Pac. 642 (1913).
61. Warehousemen apparently are treated as performing duties of public
service in a much higher degree than most other types of bailees for hire;
hence the cases generally take the position that the warehouseman lacks the
power to relieve himself from liability by contract. E.g., George v. Bekins
Van & Storage Co., 196 P.2d 637 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948). See Annot., 175
A.L.R. 8, 131-44 (1948).
62. Inglis v. Garland, 19 Cal. App. 2d 767, 64 P.2d 501 (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. 1936); Bullard v. Asa G. Candler, Inc., 32 Ga. App. 187, 122 S.E.
813 (1924); O'Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith Realty Co., 15 Ill. App. 2d
349, 146 N.E.2d 198 (1957), af'd, 15 Ill. 2d 436, 155 N.E.2d 545 (1959); J. W.
Grady Co. v. Herrick, 288 Mass. 304, 192 N.E. 748 (1934); Kirshenbaum v.
General Outdoor Advertising Co., 258 N.Y. 489, 180 N.E. 245 (1932); Burnett
v. Texas Co., 204 N.C. 460, 168 S.E. 496 (1933); Robinson v. Tate, 34 Tenn.
App. 215, 236 S.W.2d 445 (W.S. 1950); see Annot., 175 A.L.R. 8, 83 (1948);
6 WnLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1751C (rev. ed. 1938). A lease provision ex-
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Generally speaking, the courts will not permit anyone to contract
away his liability for wilful or wanton conduct.63 Such exculpatory
clauses are thought to be patently against public policy.
Tested by the criteria normally employed by most courts in de-
termining the validity of clauses relieving against liability for the
consequences of negligence, the exculpatory clause in the Moss case
would be sustained. The decision in this case is thus in line with ample
precedent. There was no apparent disparity of bargaining power be-
tween the defendant, who rented horses to riders, and plaintiff; nor
was the defendant's business of renting horses affected with any
appreciable public interest. So the policy of freedom of contract was
thought by the court to be paramount. On the other side of the coin,
there still remains the rather forceful argument against the validity
of such exculpatory contracts to the effect that such clauses have a
tendency to cause a party to become lax in the performance of his
duties. The incentive to use due and reasonable care is, in part,
destroyed; the party knows that he is insulated from liability for the
consequences of his negligence through the contract which has ex-
empted him from the payment of damages for injury suffered by the
other party to the contract.
V. AGREEMENT IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE-AGREEMENT OF SELLER OF
BUSINESS NOT To COMPETE--ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRAINT IN AREA
GREATER THAN REQUIRED To PROTECT PURCHASER
Greene County Tire & Supply, Inc. v. Spurlin64 presented the
question whether the Tennessee court would enforce an agreement by
the seller of a tire recapping business not to compete with the buyer
throughout an area which the court expressly found to be in excess
of that necessary to protect the buyer. The facts are relatively
simple. The defendant, Spurlin, was one of three stockholders in the
selling corporation which engaged in the "recapping or repairing of
automobile truck tires." The selling corporation, located in Greene-
ville, Tennessee, sold its assets to plaintiff, the Greene County Tire
and Supply Company. As part of the consideration, the selling cor-
poration, as well as all three stockholders, agreed not to engage
in a similar business for five years within a radius of 100 miles of
Greeneville. About a year later, defendant-stockholder did engage in
onerating the tenant from liability for loss due to fire has been upheld. Cerny-
Pickas Co. v. C. R. John Co., 7 Ill. 2d 393, 131 N.E.2d 100 (1936).
63. See Thomas v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 201 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1953);
Robinson v. Tate, 34 Tenn. App. 215, 227, 236 S.W.2d 445 (W.S. 1950) (may
not contract against liability for fraud); 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1751B
(rev. ed. 1938).
64. 338 S.W.2d 597 (Tenn. 1960).
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the recapping business in Greeneville. Plaintiff sued to enjoin de-
fendant from violating the non-competitive agreement. In his defense,
defendant took the position that the agreement not to compete was
unreasonable and an unlawful restraint of trade in violation of a
Tennessee statute65 and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
66
The court twice declared in its opinion that the area in which
defendant had agreed not to engage in the recapping business was
in excess of that which was necessary fairly to protect the plaintiff-
buyer in procuring the benefits of the purchase.67 The court also
thought the recapping business to be a common type of enterprise
which would be found in most of the counties of Tennessee. More-
over, this business was thought by the court to involve no trade
secrets. Nevertheless, the court found defendant's agreement not to
compete to be valid and enforced it against defendant throughout
an area having a radius of 100 miles from Greeneville, this being the
area in which defendant had agreed not to compete. As a reason for
its holding, the court declared that the public policies concerning
injury to the public or the inconvenience which would be experienced
by defendant resulting from the enforcement of the agreement were
of less weight than public policies with reference to maintaining
honesty and freedom of alienation.
Neither the Tennessee statute68 involved in this case nor the Sher-
man Anti-Trust Act 69 outlaws all agreements in restraint of trade,
but only those that constitute an "unreasonable" restraint. In de-
termining whether the particular restraint of trade comes within the
statutory condemnation, both the Tennessee statute and Sherman
Anti-Trust Act apply the "rule of reason.170 For practical purposes
it thus appears that the agreements and combinations in restraint of
trade to which both statutes are applicable are the same as those that
are made unenforceable by the common law.71 In short, both statutes
seem to provide new penalties and enforcing sanctions to the same
65. TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-101 (1956).
66. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958).
67. 338 S.W.2d at 600.
68. Baird v. Smith, 128 Tenn. 410, 161 S.W. 492 (1913). In an earlier issue
of the Tennessee Survey, the writer had occasion to deal somewhat exten-
sively with another Tennessee case dealing with the enforceability of a cove-
nant not to compete, where the same Tennessee statute was involved. See
Hartman, Contracts-1957 Tennessee Survey, 10 VAND. L. REV. 1013, 1033
(1957).
69. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920); Stand-
ard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
70. This "rule of reason" was expressly adopted and applied in Dark
Tobacco Growers' Ass'n v. Dunn, 150 Tenn. 614, 266 S.W. 308 (1924); State
ex rel. Attorney-General v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Ass'n, 2 Tenn. App. 674
(E.S. 1926).




agreements that were unenforceable at common law because the re-
straint was unreasonable.72
Professor Williston, the eminent authority on contracts, states that
it is everywhere agreed that in order to be valid a promise imposing
a restraint in trade or occupation must be reasonable.73 In considering
what is reasonable, the authorities make it clear that regard must be
paid, among other things, to the question whether the promise is
wider than is necessary for the protection of the promisee in some
legitimate interest.74 Professor Williston also adds that if the restraint
imposed is greater than necessary for the protection of the covenan-
tee, the promise is necessarily invalid.7 5
The question necessarily arises, therefore: When is an agreement
restraining competition unreasonable with respect to the area covered
and therefore unenforceable? In resolving this query, the authorities
make the question turn on whether the area embraced in the agree-
ment is greater than is required for the protection of the good will
of the business.76 The purpose of enforcing a restraining promise
that is ancillary to a contract for the sale of a business with its good
will is to make good will a saleable asset by protecting the buyer
in the enjoyment of that for which he pays.77 Consequently, as is
pointed out by Professor Corbin, very many cases have held a re-
straining agreement valid on the ground that it was ancillary to
such a purchase and that the extent of the restraint was no greater
than was reasonably necessary to protect the buyer's interest. 8 On
the other hand, Professor Corbin declares that the authorities make
it equally plain that a promise by a seller not to compete with the
buyer is illegal and unenforceable insofar as the restraint is in excess
of the extent of the good will purchased.79 The restraint is illegal
if it covers territory greater in extent than that in which the seller
72. In addition to cases cited in note 70 supra, see Appalachian Coals, Inc.
v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1 (1911); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 106 (1911);
6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1397 (1951).
73. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1636 (rev. ed. 1937).
74. Ibid; 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1384 (1951). For a comprehensive collec-
tion of authorities dealing, in part, with this facet of the problem, see Arthur
Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685 (Ohio C.P. 1952). For
an exhaustive collection of cases dealing with the importance of the territory
covered as affecting the validity 'of a restrictive covenant, see Annot.,
46 A.L.R.2d 119 (1956). See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 515, 516 (1932).
75. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1636 (rev. ed. 1937). See exhaustive Annot.,
46 A.L.R.2d 119, 205, 215 (1956) to the same effect.
76. 6 CoRmI, CONTRACTS § 1386 (1951), and cases cited. See also Annot.,
78 A.L.R. 1038, 1039 (1932). See exhaustive annotation in which this facet of
the problem is accentuated in 46 A.L.R.2d 119, 149, 204, 215 (1956).
77. 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1385, 1387 (1951).
78. 6 id. § 1386.
79. 6 id. § 1390. See extensive annotation to this effect, 46 A.L.R.2d 119, 188-
252 (1956).
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had already developed business and good will.8 0 As Professor Willis-
ton puts it: "One whose business is confined to New York is not
helped by the promise of another not to do business in Chicago, and
if the promise is enforced by injunction the promisor is injured,
while the promisee is not correspondingly helped."8' Nor is a re-
straint on competition made reasonable by the fact that the buyer
afterwards extends his business into the larger territory or by the
fact that he himself was already doing business in such larger terri-
tory.82
As we have already seen, the Spurlin opinion seems to make it
clear that the area in which defendant-seller agreed not to engage in
the recapping business was in excess of that which was necessary
fairly to protect the plaintiff-buyer in procuring the benefits of the
purchase. This fact alone shows that part of the Spurlin restraint
was unreasonable under well-established principles of law.
Since an agreement restricting competition may be perfectly rea-
sonable as to a part of the territory included within the restraint, but
unreasonable as to the remainder of the territory, what will the
courts do with such an agreement? The cases make it clear that such
an agreement is illegal and unenforceable insofar as the restraint
is in excess of the extent of the good will purchased.83 When the
court enforces the Spurlin-type agreement in a territory greater in
extent than that which is reasonably necessary for the protection of
the plaintiff's interest, it does so squarely in the teeth of the over-
whelming weight of authority. What will courts faced with the
Spurlin situation do? Will the courts enforce such an agreement in
part while holding the remainder invalid? Or will they hold the en-
tire agreement to be illegal and void where the restraint imposed
is in excess of what was reasonable?
The courts split on this question. Professor Corbin states the law
to the effect that many cases have held the entire contract to be
illegal and void where the restraint imposed was in excess of what
was reasonable and the terms of the agreement indicated no line of
division.84 However, Professor Corbin also states that in the best
considered modern cases the court has decreed enforcement as against
a defendant whose breach has occurred within an area in which
restriction would clearly be reasonable, even though the terms of
the agreement imposed a larger and unreasonable restraint.85 Under
80. See 6 CORBI, CONTRACTS § 1387 (1951>.
81. 5 WILISTONI CONTRACTS § 1636, at 4581 (rev. ed. 1937).
82. See 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1387 (1951). Some authority takes the view
that the territorial scope may include reasonable expectation of expansion.
Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 119, 253 (1956).
83. See text and supporting authorities in notes 79, 80, 81, 82 supra.




this latter view, the Spurlin agreement should have been enforced
within an area in which the restriction would clearly be reasonable
but should not have been enforced in those areas where the restraint
would have been unreasonable.
In short, one line of authority, supported by very many cases,
would have held the entire Spurlin restraint to be illegal and void
because, by what seems to be treated as a fact by the court, the re-
straint imposed was in excess of what was reasonable. The other line
of authority would have enforced the restraint against the defendant
within an area in which the restriction would clearly be reasonable
but would not have enforced the agreement beyond what was reason-
ably necessary to protect plaintiff in the benefits of the sales trans-
action. It is rather apparent, however, that neither view supports
the Spurlin decision insofar as it enforces the restraint throughout the
area in excess of what was necessary to protect the plaintiff-buyer in
the enjoyment of that for which he paid.
The Spurlin opinion 86 relies on 78 American Law Reports 1039 to
support its conclusion that it should enforce the restraint throughout
the entire area. However, on the same page of the same authority is
this pertinent summary that suggests that the court should not have
enforced the restraint insofar as it was not reasonably necessary to
protect the buyer: "In determining whether the covenant does im-
pose an unreasonable restraint upon trade, the question is whether
the area embraced therein is greater than is required for the pro-
tection of the good will of the business sold, and this ordinarily is one
of fact.187 The Tennessee Supreme Court seems to regard it as a fact
that the restraint in the Spurlin case was "in excess of that which
seems necessary to fairly protect Greene County Tire and Supply,
Inc. [plaintiff], in procuring the benefits intended by the purchase of
these assets in carrying on of such a common place business."88 The
Spurlin opinion's own cited authority, therefore, suggests a different
decision in Spurlin.
86. 338 S.W.2d at 600.
87. Annot., 78 A.L.R. 1038, 1039 (1932).
88. 338 S.W.2d at 600.
1216 [ VOL,. 14
